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Supervisory authority
Data protection by default
Data protection by design
Data protection impact assessment1 COM(2012) 11 final. A first version of th
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0267-3649/$ e see front matter ª 2012 Luiz C
doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2012.03.015a b s t r a c t
This paper explores the European Commission’s proposal for a new Regulation to update
and reform data protection law in Europe. As regards the Regulation itself, without pre-
senting an exhaustive analysis of all the provisions, this paper aims to highlight some
significant changes proposed to the data protection regime by comparison between
Directive 95/46 and the proposed Regulation. It takes particularly into account legislative
innovation concerning data protection principles, data subjects’ rights, data controllers
and data processors obligations, and the regulation of technologies. Before analyzing these
innovations, it introduces some considerations about the Commission’s choice to use
a Regulation instead of a Directive to harmonize national data protection regime.
ª 2012 Luiz Costa & Yves Poullet. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction 2. Regulation instead of directiveOn 25 January 2012 the European Commission presented the
proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with
regards to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of suchdata; the so-called “General Data Protection
Regulation”1 (cited herein after as “the Regulation”). When it
comes into force, the document will be the new general legal
framework of data protection, repealing Directive 95/46 more
than twenty-seven years after its adoption. At the same time
and constituting what is the “Data Protection Package”, the
Commission introduces a proposal for a Directive on the
protection of individuals with regards to the processing of
personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free
movement of such data.2 This second text will not be
commented in the present article.e draft has circulated, d
licable to the processing
on with the suppression
osta & Yves Poullet. PubThe harmonization obtained by the Directive 95/46 has
seemed insufficient. The strong reassertion of the Data
Protection as a fundamental right, both by the article 8 (1) of
the 2000 EU Charter of fundamental rights and by the article
16 (1) of the Treaty, requires an effective and more coherent
protection of the EU citizens throughout the European
Union. It might be added that due to the increasing number
of data flows and their globalization, Europe might no longer
accept different national data protection legislations both as
regards their content and their effectiveness. That situation
hampers the functioning of the internal market and co-
operation between public authorities in relation to EU poli-
cies, creates confusion and uncertainties for data controllers
and provokes a loss of trust for citizens. Furthermore, this
lack of full harmonization weakens the capacity of EU to
speak with one voice at the international level. That is why,ated from 29/11/2011. The final draft introduces certain minor
activities related to these purposes and subject to this specific
of the traditional pillars and might create certain uncertainties as
lished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
c om p u t e r l aw & s e c u r i t y r e v i ew 2 8 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 2 5 4e2 6 2 255in order to ensure a full consistent and high level of protec-
tion equivalent in all the EU member states, a Regulation
was judged as the adequate solution to ensure full
harmonization.
That solution has different consequences. First, the text
adds to the powers of the Commission to define and imple-
ment certain provisions3 or to adopt specific texts as regards
certain sectors. The exercise of these delegations is under
the sole control of the EU Parliament and Council. Secondly,
as we will develop later, the text provides a stronger
uniformity as regards the quality, the competence and the
powers of the national Data Protection Authorities (DPA)
(Chapter VI, art. 46 and ff.), reinforces their co-operation
(Chapter VII, Section 1) and puts into place a “consistency
mechanism”, which obliges each DPA to cooperate with each
other and with the Commission. Thirdly, the Commission
through different mechanisms of notification and evocation
will monitor the different decisions taken by the Member
States.4 See however the opinion of the Art. 29 WG, Working Paper 4/
2007 on the concept of personal data, WP n 136 (June 20, 2007)
which aims to enlarge the concept of personal data, taking into
account that a processing might affect an individual which as3. Less privacy, more data protection?
Both Directive 95/46 and the Regulation present data protec-
tion and free movement of personal data as their objects.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Article 1 of Directive 95/
46 provides that Member States must “protect the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in
particular their right to privacywith respect to the processing
of personal data”. Instead, Article 1, 2, of the Regulation
previews among its objectives the need to “protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in
particular their right to the protection of personal data”. The
Regulation clearly dissociates data protection from privacy
and launches its basis exclusively on the first one; the word
‘privacy’ is gone. In addition, the distinction is reinforced
when the Regulation establishes the concepts of “data
protection assessment” and “data protection by design”,
which are clearly unusual terms in comparison with “privacy
impact assessment” and “privacy by design”. The word
‘Privacy’ appears 13 times in Directive 95/46 while only three
times in the Regulation. Is data protection breaking up with
its origins? If yes, what will be the outcomes of this move-
ment? New legal correlations between privacy and data
protection must be established? The outcomes of this change
are still to come, but it is certain that affirming the autonomy
of the right to the protection of personal data does not imply
denying privacy as its fundament. That distinction puts
protection of liberties at risk since it cuts the Data Protection
regulation from the innovative and quite protective Stras-
bourg Court’s jurisprudencewhich repeats that privacymight
be considered as the way to achieve the right to self-
determination, to dignity and, to that extent, represents an
essential condition for all liberties. One must reassert the
intrinsic link between Privacy and Data Protection legislation
that, in an information society, is viewed as a simple tool for
conserving the different human liberties rather than as an
end per se.3 See the long list enumerated in Article 86.4. Which personal data?
Under Directive 95/46 the concept of personal data is related to
nominative identification. According to Article 2, a, personal
data is:
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person (’data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identificationnumberor tooneormore factors specific tohisphysical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
Technological innovations have called this concept into
question. ‘Identifiability’ implies distinguishing someone
among others, notwithstanding the knowledge or the poten-
tial knowledge of his or her names. Traditionally personal data
means potential reference to nominative data, within private
and public IT systems, e.g. the public registration number,
names, addresses, health and financial data. However, today,
the use of certain technologies allows contacting and even
profiling people regardless of any nominative information. In
other words, data processors do not even need to knowwho is
the data subject behind such data in order to make him or her
identifiable; for instance, it is enough to know his or her navi-
gation habits through a cookie or an Internet protocol number,
or his or hermovements through a tag linkedwith an object in
his or her possession. This means that it is possible to process
particular, peculiar data about a person without the need to
reveal his or her nominative identity. Since the concept of
personal data in Directive 95/46 was unclear and was consid-
ered usually as not taking these possibilities into account4,
a loophole existed that placed privacy at risk.
This risk is not disregarded by the Regulation, which states
in the Preamble that:
when using online services, individuals are associatedwith online
identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and
protocols, such as Internet Protocol addresses or cookie identifiers.
Since this leave traces which, combined with unique identifiers
and other information received by the servers, can be used to
create profiles of the individuals and identify them, this Regula-
tion should be applicable to processing involving such data.
According to the Regulation, personal data is any infor-
mation relating to a data subject and data subject is
an identified natural person or a natural person who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, by means reasonably likely to be
used by the controller or by any other natural or legal person, in
particular by reference to an identification number, location data,
online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical,
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social iden-
tity of that person [emphasis added] (Article 4,1).such is not identified and will never be identified by his or her
name.
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especially from the reference to the means reasonably likely
to be used to identify a person? Assuming that the novelty in
the wording is intended to offer more protection to citizens,
we can speculate that ‘identifiability’ implies a need for data
protection, regardless of the used means. These means are
presumably nominative data, terminal identifiers or any other
identifier because, if someone can be distinguished fromother
people, data protection legislation is applicable. If this is
correct, one could say that the Regulation is more protective
than the Directive since it clarifies situationswhere legislation
is incidental. One aspect of privacy and data protection is
a remedy against intrusiveness and loss of control of the
circulation of a person’s informational image. Such intru-
siveness and its loss do not only exist when someone is or can
be identified; for instance, the acts of being observed and
being traced are privacy threats, even without knowing the
name of the observed or traced person.5. Transparency
Relations between citizens, governments and industry are
asymmetric and data protection legislation faces the chal-
lenge to protect citizens, counterbalancing the strength of
governments and industry. The asymmetric knowledge about
the functioning of IT is one source of this imbalance of
strength. Citizens are rarely aware about how their data are
collected and processed while they are surfing on the Internet
at home, using their cellphones, walking down a video-
surveyed street or with an RFID tag embedded in their
clothes and so on. In this context, transparency is a normative
value that talks about being open and clear and is a remedy
against obscurity and opacity: in relation to data processing,
transparency translates the widening of the knowledge about
information systems. If transparency was considered, from
the very first texts, to be a major principle of the general data
protection framework, it was at first coupled with the prin-
ciple of fairness.
According to theprevious texts, Article 5, a, of theRegulation
stipulates that personal data must be “processed lawfully, fairly
and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject”.
Furthermore, transparency requires greater awareness among
citizens about the processing going on: its existence, its content
and the flows generated in and out by using terminals. This
means that it is present not only in the statement of its
substance and procedures (Articles 11, 12 and 13) but also in
every rule related to its core.For instance,providing information
is an essential way to make transparency effective. To do this,
one must know both what and how to make information
available. Therefore, rights concerned with information and
access to data (Articles 14 and 15) are clearly related to trans-
parency. But these deductions are classic and not very innova-
tive. In our opinion, the authors of the Regulationhavenot been
sufficiently innovative, for the greater the flow of information
the more opaque it becomes in modern information systems
and with new ICT applications. In that case the right to trans-
parencymust increase alongside these new processes.
It is worth noting that, as in the Directive, the Regulation
establishes a minimal list of information to be provided tocitizens (“the controller shall provide the data subject with at least
the following information [.]”). It would have been interesting to
have given data controllers new specific duties. Does trans-
parency imply that the controller must provide specific
information where more complex infrastructure is involved e
for instance information about how tags and readers work in
RFID applications e even though not previewed in the Regu-
lation? If yes, what standards should operate to guide the
provision of information? As regards the use of profiling
systems, should it be necessary to give information about the
logic between the building-up of the profiles. New trans-
parency duties could also operate among terminal producers
in order to ensure that the functioning of these terminals will
be transparent for his or her user.
Transparency is also related to data security and risk
management. Evaluating risks is a motto constantly repeated in
our societies, and in the Regulation the communications of
personal data breaches to the subject and data protection
assessment are twoexamples of this risk approach. In relation to
the first one, we know that according to the Data Protection
principle, data controllers and processorsmust takemeasures to
assurea level of securityappropriate to the risks topersonal data.
That assertion is already present in theDirective. The Regulation
will lay down the consequence of insufficient security by regu-
lating the personal data breach in a largely more extensive way
than that enacted in 2009 in the e-Privacy Directive concerning
certain telecommunication operators’ processing. So a personal
data breach is the causation of “accidental or unlawful destruc-
tion, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to,
personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed”
(Article 4,9). In this context, when a personal data breach occurs
the controller must notify the supervisory authority (Article 31)
and communicate with data subjects if there is risk of harm to
privacy or personal data (Article 32).
What outcomes then are to be expected from the arrival of
the transparency principle in data protection legislation? How
will it interact with other data protection principles? Bymeans
of enhancing awareness about risk, does transparency
engender a general “right to know” among individuals?6. Control-rights: the right to be forgotten
and the right to data portability
People have very limited control over their personal data,
which aremore andmore processed and archived indefinitely.
The common ground between the right to be forgotten and
data portability is found in the objective to strengthen data
subjects’ rights since both grant prerogatives through which
persons can affect the processing of their personal data.
6.1. Right to be forgotten
The Regulation establishes the right to be forgotten and to
erasure, which consists of securing from the controller the
erasure of personal data as well prevention of any further
dissemination of this data. In this contextwewill now glimpse
at its fundaments, the relations between this right and tradi-
tional data protection principles and rules as well as
perspectives on its effectiveness.
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root of the right to be forgotten. Based on the fundamental
principles of dignity and self-development, the right to
informational self-determination “provides individuals the
power to decide themselves about issues of collection, disclosure and
use of their personal data”.5 The Regulation states that the right
to be forgotten has special relevance when the individual
made data available while as a child. Here, a “clean slate”
approach seems to be taken into account, the principle being
that the right should relate to a protection against the negative
use of past information.6 The use of data from social networks
in employment contexts is a representative example. Personal
data such as photos taken in private contexts have been used
to refuse job positions and fire people. But forgetfulness is
larger. It is one dimension of how people deal with their own
history, being related not only to leaving the past behind but
also to living in the present without the threat of a kind of
‘Miranda’ warning, where whatever you say can be used
against you in the future. In this sense the right to be forgotten
is closely related to entitlements of dignity and self-
development. Once again, privacy appears as the pre-
requisite of our liberties, assuring the possibility to freely
express ourselves and move freely on the street..
The right to be forgotten finds root in four instances in
which its attributes are clearly related to some DP principles:
where data are no longer necessary in relation to the
purposes for which they were collected or processed (which
recalls the finality principle); where data subjects have
withdrawn their consent for processing; where data subjects
object to the processing of personal data concerning them or
where the processing of personal data does not comply with
the Regulation e these last two hypotheses evoke the rights
to rectify, erase and block data processing previewed within
Article 12,b of the Directive 95/46. Beyond these general
relations, the right to be forgotten amplifies the effectiveness
of data protection principles and rules. For instance, while
the Directive allows people to erase data only where there is
no compliance with the law, the Regulation also grants
individuals the right to erase where they have withdrawn
their consent, which represents a clear increment to user
control.
As elsewhere, the effectiveness of any right relies on the
accountability of obligations established to a responsible
reviewer. Three sorts of duties are established to the data
controller: erasing data under his control and not processing
them further; informing third parties that the data subject
requests the erasure of data; and being responsible for publi-
cations done by third parties under his authorization (Article
17,2 and 8). The welcome statement of obligations clearly
deserves further development. One issue, for example, is how
to enforce the right to be forgotten where there is no direct5 A. ROUVROY and Y. POULLET, “The right to informational self-
determination and the value of self-development e Reassessing
the importance of privacy for democracy”, in Reinventing data
protection, Proceedings of the Colloquium held at Brussels, Nov
2007, Springer Verlag, 2009. P. 56.
6 A. ROUVROY, «Réinventer l’art d’oublier et de se faire oublier
dans la société de l’information?», in La sécurité de l’individu
numérisé. Réflexions prospectives et internationales., 2008, pp.
249e278.relation between the subject and the data controller e e.g.
a data mining company? Informing third parties of the indi-
vidual’s request to erase or block data can help to make the
measures effective, but how do the rules constrain third
parties to complywith a duty that was originally imposed only
on the data controller? Since privacy is relational, how should
they resolve conflicts between individuals e for instance,
erasing common photos and posts on a social network web-
site e when two persons oppose each other? Should the
controller be the referee to evaluate a conflict between privacy
and freedom of expression (Article 17,3)? If yes, which
parameters should guide the controller?
The effectiveness of the right to be forgottenmust also rely
on a techno-legal approach. Which technical solutions should
be adopted to assure the erasure and blocking data on Internet
servers? How can these be made effective concerning data
stored on terminal equipment such as computers and mobile
devices? Answering these questions demand the establish-
ment of “privacy-by-design” obligations. The creation of these
obligations will depend on how the Commission specifies the
conditions, criteria and requirements to (a) specific sectors
and data processing situations, (b) the deletion of links copies
and replications of personal data and (c) the restrictions to
process data (Article 18,9).
6.2. Data portability
According to the Regulation, data portability is twofold. First,
it implies the right of data subjects to obtain from the
controller a copy of their personal data in a structured and
commonly used format (Article 18,1). In this context, data
portability is a kind of right to backup and use personal
information under the management of the data controller.
Second, data portability grants the right to transmit personal
data and other information provided by the data subject from
one automated processing system to another one (Article
18,2). Here, data portability is therefore the right to take
personal data and leave.
The benefits of data portability are clear. As within the case
of the Universal Service Directive’s number portability, data
portability empowers subjects as it liberates them from the
constraint of having their data tied to a specific service
provider. From this point of view, data portability gives more
freedom of choice to people while at the same time stimu-
lating competition among service providers. However, further
developments are necessary to protect privacy. For instance,
moving personal photos from a social network to another
location may affect the interests of other individuals; what
legal and technical solutions must be adopted to protect third
party’s privacy in this situation? What rules need to exist to
balance conflicts between individuals?7. Old principles, new dimensions?
The Regulation has changed the phrasing of the principles
relating to adequacy, relevancy, minimization and consent.
Abetter choice ofwords is notedwith regard to theamount of
data to be processed. Directive 95/46 says data must not be
excessive while the Regulation says it must be limited to the
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clearly encouraging as the first one is. Let us highlight the con-
cerned Articles from both texts, where personal data must be:
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes
for which they are collected and/or further processed in the
Directive 95/46 (Article 6, 1, c)and7 In the context of the works done by the Council of Europe
about profiling and privacy, J.M. DINANT, C. LAZARO, Y. POUL-
LET, A. ROUVROY, “Profiling and data protection”, Report addressed
to the Convention 108 consultative Committee, September 2008,
available on the Council of Europe website. See in the same sense,
M. HILDEBRANDT, “ Profiling and the Identity of the European
Citizen”, in Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence, in WRIGHT
David, GUTWIRTH SERGE, FRIEDEWALD Michael, PUNIE YVES,
VILDJIOUNAITE Elena, AHONEN P., ALAHUHTA P., DASKALA B.,
DE HERT PAUL, DELAITRE Sabine, LINDNER A., MAGHIROS Ioan-
nis, MOSCIBRODA Anna Agata, SCHREURS Wim, VERLINDEN
Michiel, The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology ,
2008, Vol. 1,, published by Springer.adequate, relevant, and limited to the minimum necessary in
relation to the purposes for which they are processed [.] in the
Regulation (Article 5, c).
Data collection is essential because it is not only the
entrancedoorof informationsystems,butalso theveryfirst act
that places a person (i.e. her data) in touch with IT systems.
Consequently, legislation surrounds data collection with
special care, as when it establishes obligations upon the
controller to provide quality information to the data subject
even before the collection takes place. Another example is the
Article 6, 1, c of Directive 95/46, which links the characteristics
of adequacy, relevancyandnon-excessiveness to the purposes
of collection and processing of data. This means that these
characteristics must be considered with regard to data collec-
tion; in other words, data collection circumstances e the
moment it occurs and how it occurs for instance e are espe-
cially significant to define the legitimacy of data processing. In
that context, it is a matter of regret that nothing has been said
about the right of citizens to remain anonymous, each time an
individual’s identification is not necessary. We know that, for
different reasons, most data controllers impose a priori the
revealing of the names and other attributes of their potential
customers even when no transaction or other justification
makes that revelation pertinent.
Another point needs to be mentioned here. The Regulation
cuts out the reference to the purposes for which data “are
collected”, in spite of maintainingmention of the purposes for
which data “are processed”. This might be understandable
since collection is as such a processing. However, having
suppressed the specific mention to the link between the
collection of data on the one hand and adequacy, relevancy
and minimum data on the other, the Regulation creates the
risk that it might weaken the protection as regards the
collection of data. With this open door, one could argue that
the legitimacy of data processing does not particularly need to
rely on the purposes established at the moment of collection.
At last, the consent framework is going to be significantly
modified by the Regulation, which gives broader definition
and conditions of consent compared to Directive 95/46.
According to the Regulation, consent is any “freely given
specific, informed and explicit indication of his or her wishes
bywhich the data subject signifies agreement to personal data
relating to them being processed” (Article 4,8). The reference
to “freely given, informed and explicit” attributes is clearer
than the precedent “unambiguously” consent. However, the
concept of the Regulation creates an odd reference to the
“wishes” through which the data subject “signifies” the
agreement to data processing. A wish is a desire and it is clear
that people wish, desire to access new services, to amplify
their experience with new technologies and applications andso on. Nevertheless, a wish is not synonym of will, which is
a deliberate choice that produces legal consequences.
Wishing to use a service is not a synonym to awareness of the
legal consequences of saying yes specifically as regards the
processing of personal data generated by this use. Will, rather
than wishes, is at the heart of a data protection regime. Still
further about the consent, the Regulation in its Article 7
establishes welcome procedural and substantive conditions.
We highlight Article 7,4, which embraces the proportionality
principle approach when it establishes that “consent shall not
provide a legal basis for the processing, where there is
a significant imbalance between the position of the data
subject and the controller”.8. The framing of profiling
The classical protection in respect of automated individual
decisions of the Directive (Article 15) is considerably enlarged
in relation to profiling (art. 20 of the Regulation), which covers
also the use of data correlations to predict behaviors or to take
decisions vis-à-vis targeted people (e.g. citizens suspected of
potential fiscal fraud). Doing so, the European Commission
follows a recent recommendation of the Council of Europe
regarding profiling (Nov. 25, 2010).7
Three points deserve special attention since they distin-
guish between the traditional regimes of automated indi-
vidual decisions from the new one about profiling. Classical
automated individual decisions take into account directly
data referred to a certain individual in order to apply to these
data automated reasoning. However, modern techniques of
profiling are using huge nominate or innominate data (e.g. the
average incomes of people living in a certain area) to define
abstract profiles (e.g. people engaging in that kind of surfing at
85% are likely to be interested in those kinds of specific
products or services ormight be suspected of fiscal fraud). The
profile is applied to a specific person known or unknown only
as a second step, sometimes to take decisions or simply to
gain better knowledge of the individual, notably in case of
marketing. The Council of Europe defines profiling as “an
automatic data processing technique that consists of applying
a “profile” to an individual, particularly in order to take deci-
sions concerning her or him or for analyzing or predicting her
or his personal preferences, behaviors and attitudes”.
The second point concerns the shift from the protection in
regard to automated decisions (Directive 95/46) to the
protection in relation to profiling (Regulation). Instead of
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protection in the face of a measure. While the word ‘decision’
supposes that a judgment takes place (approving credit or
fixing the price of health assurance for instance), the word
‘measure’ stands for any action toward a goal (e.g. using data
correlation for marketing purposes). In this sense, the word
‘measure’ involves a larger set of actions, including the taking
of decisions. Similarly, the Regulation links the protection not
only to the evaluation of personal aspects, but also to the
prediction of behavior. Having broadened the actions that are
subject to its scope, the Regulation seeks to guarantee more
protection to citizens than the Directive 95/46.
The third point concerns the list of exceptions. Article 20 of
the Regulation uses a similar composition of Article 15 of
Directive 95/46; i.e., as a rule, it forbids measures based on
automated processing. But while the Directive previews two
exceptions to this general prohibition e contract and specific
law e the Regulation adds a third one: data subject’s consent.
Direct consequences relate to the conditions of consent.
Considering that consent to profiling is different from con-
senting to data processing, data processors must ensure that
distinguishable conditions exist for the data subject to consent
to profiling, according to the Article 7,2 of the Regulation.
Moreover, there is a clear correlation betweenprofiling, consent
and data subject’s right of access. As stated by the Regulation:
“every data subject should therefore have the right to know and
obtain communication in particular for what purposes the data
are processed, for what period, which recipients receive the data,
what is the logic of the data that are undergoing the processing
and what might be, at least when based on profiling, the conse-
quences of such processing”.
How this correlation will be achieved is a question to be
answered. It is true that the Regulation recognizes that the
rightof accesswill, for example, sometimesbeconfrontedwith
trade secrets and copyright issues. It affirms that this
confrontation must not imply a general denial of information
about the logic or the correlations which are used for building-
up the profile applied to the data subjects (number 51). But the
Regulation does not go any further. Having opened the door to
consent to legitimate profiling, the Regulation does not estab-
lish counterparts in favor of citizens: how to assure trans-
parency with regard to profiling? What parameters to guide
access to the information related to the logicofprofiling?When
data controllers will be authorized to deny access? The mere
protection against a general denial of information is not only
inconsistent with the transparency principle but is also
imbalanced and far from satisfactory in protecting citizens.8 As asserted by Anne Cavoukian, DPA Commissioner from
Ontario (Canada) in its introductory remarks to the Privacy
Guidelines for RFID Information Systems available on the web
site: http://www.ipc.on.ca: “Privacy and Security must be built in
from the Outset e at the design Stage”.9. Responsibility and liability
The effectiveness of legislation grounds itself on the obliga-
tions to respond to acts e responsibility e and to repair
damage e liability.
Not explicitly mentioned by Directive 95/46, responsibility is
plentifully established in the Regulation. With regard to the
controllers, responsibility traduces itself into the adoption of
policies and the implementation of measures to perform dataprocessing in compliance with the Regulation (Article 22). These
measures include implementing data security requirements
and, for instance, performing data protection impact assess-
ment. The Regulation also fixes the responsibility of joint
controllers (Article 24), representatives of controllers not estab-
lished in the Union (Article 25) and processors (Article 26).
Differently, liability is already considered by Directive 95/
46, which establishes a liability regime based on compen-
sating harm and presumption of fault. According to Article 23:
“any person who has suffered damage as a result of an unlawful
processing operation or of any act incompatible with the national
provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive is entitled to receive
compensation from the controller for the damage suffered”.
Moreover, “the controller may be exempted from this liability, in
whole or in part, if he proves that he is not responsible for the
event giving rise to the damage”.
The Regulation introduces two substantial changes to this
liability regime. First, it includesprocessorsas liable fordamages:
being those who act upon data on behalf of controllers. Proces-
sors are highly engaged in data processing and for this their
inclusion in the roll of liability is reasonable. Second, the Regu-
lation establishes that “wheremore than one controller or processor is
involved in the processing, each controller or processor shall be jointly
and severally liable for the entire amount of the damage”. In effect,
dilution of liability is a problem faced in data processing. Viola-
tions of personal data take place within scenarios of multiple
actors in which it is difficult to identify the one at fault (tech-
nologycreators,serviceproviders,etc.)andthepluralityofcauses
(data breaches, deficient design, etc.) adds an extra obstacle to
determine liability. Establishing joint liability to controllers and
processors removes from the shoulders of data subjects the
burden to prove whose fault it is.
One last point, the Regulation imposes upon the actors
mentioned in the previous paragraphs the duty to cooperate
with the supervisory authority (art. 29) and notably to main-
tain documentation (art. 28) containing the different items of
the ‘notification’ that are mandatory under the Directive, but
only those necessary so as to alleviate the data controllers’
administrative charges.10. The regulation of technologies
Beyond the traditional mechanisms of responsibility and
liability, the new framework opens theway in European law to
the regulation of technologies, of which data protection by
design, data protection by default and data protection impact
assessment are three remarkable principles.
As regards the two first principles, the first one: ‘Data
protection by design’8 is defined in the following terms:
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mentation, the controller shall, both at the time of the determi-
nation of the means for processing and at the time of the
processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organ-
isational measures and procedures in such a way that the pro-
cessing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and ensure
the protection of the rights of the data subject (Article 23.1).
Data Protection by design is the expression clearly inspired
by the concept of Privacy by design (PbD), which “refers to the
philosophy and approach of embedding privacy into the
design specifications of various technologies”. PbD applies
“into the design, operation and management of information
processing technologies and systems”. An early reference to
PbD is made in the Commission Recommendation of
12.5.2009, which establishes that privacy and security
concernsmust be built in radio-frequency identification (RFID)
applications before their widespread use. Is the change from
PbD to Data Protection by Design a specialization of meaning
or will the expressions be considered as synonyms? Does Data
Protection by Design imply embedding in technologies other
values than privacy and security? How will the cost of
implementation interfere with the responsibility of the
controller? Given that the design of technology is essential in
this approach why is there no reference to designers?
The second principle is also defined by the Regulation and
claimedovera longperiodbyprivacyadvocates. ‘DataProtectionby
default’ is defined by the Regulation in these terms (Article 23.2):
“The controller shall implement mechanisms for ensuring that,
by default, only those personal data are processed which are
necessary for each specific purpose of the processing and are
especially not collected or retained beyond the minimum neces-
sary for those purposes, both in terms of the amount of the data
and the time of their storage. In particular, those mechanisms
shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible
to an indefinite number of individuals”.
Data protection by default is evidently related to the data
minimization principle, according to which (a) processing non-
personal data have preference over processing personal data
and (b) if personaldataprocessing isnecessary, itmustbe limited
to the minimum (Article 5,c). In this context, Data Protection by
Default is a powerful instrument at the service not only of data
minimization specifically but also of privacy in general, as it
tends to give back to data subjects control over the disclosure of
their personal data. In practice, for instance, it implies that in
social networks, individual profiles should be kept private from
others by default.9 The data protection by default spectrum is
large and may also affect contract practices. For instance, it can9 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the
Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions e “A comprehensive approach on
personal data protection in the European Union.”, p. 23.
10 On “Privacy Impact Assessment”, see R. CLARKE, “Privacy
impact assessment: Its origins and development”, CL&SR, 2009,
pp. 123 and ff. This article provides in two appendices a list of
exemplars of PIA documents and references to guidelines
describing different PIA methodologies.prevent service providers from unilaterally modifying their
privacy policy to process more personal data.
In addition, the obligation to conduct Data Protection Impact
Assessment10 as a third principle, is established by Article 33,1:
Where processing operations present specific risks to the rights and
freedoms of data subjects by virtue of their nature, their scope or
their purposes, the controller or the processor acting on the control-
ler’s behalf shall carry out an assessment of the impact of the
envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data.
Data Protection Impact Assessment is thus defined as the
evaluation “of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the
protection of personal data where those processing operations are likely
to present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects by
virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes” (Article 33).Having
taken into account the data subjects’ views, as noticed by the
Article33.4, IndustryandGovernmentshave toevaluate risksnot
only as specified at the Article 33 on data protection but more
broadly on the different liberties asmentioned at the Article 33.3
and on the human dignity of the data subjects in order to justify
their decisions. Transparency of this previous risk assessment
worksasan important instrument topromotedemocraticdebate
through risk assessment since it promotes opennesswith regard
to the decision-making processes.
Risk assessment is a procedure by which one distinguishes
non-plausible from plausible risks and assesses the likelihood
that thesewill occur. Privacy ImpactAssessment (PIA)ewhich
is at the heart of Data Protection Impact Assessmente is a sort
of risk assessment since it aims to evaluate the potential
consequences of an activity on privacy and data protection.
Beyond the verification of legal compliance, PIAs “have to
consider privacy risks in a wider framework that takes into account
the broader set of community values and expectations about
privacy”11. Consequently, PIAs are related to a form of political
legitimacy of decisions concerning privacy and data protec-
tion. What balance will Data Protection Impact Assessment
achieve with regard to “rights and freedoms of data subjects”?
Is Data Protection Impact Assessment a parameter of a general
duty of care? If yes, howwill this determine responsibility and
liability of actions according to this parameter?11. Independent supervisory authority
The Regulation aims to enhance both the powers of the supervi-
sory authorities and the consistency of their actions. According to
therecentECJdecisionabout theconditionof the independencyof
the Data Protection Authorities, different detailed provisions
(Articles 47 and ff.) are fixing rules guaranteeing this indepen-
dency. As regards the powers, the Regulation, in its articles 52 and
ff., creates uniform arrangements by upgrading them in certain
countries: all the supervisory authorities will enjoy the compe-
tence to monitor, investigate and take decisions (including a ban
on processing activities) on their own initiative or on a basis of
a complaint coming from data subjects acting individually or
collectively (see infra). If the Regulation suppresses the obligation
of notification, which was considered an administrative burden,11 Warren et al. (2008, p. 235).
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than 250 employees) a duty to designate a Data Protection Officer
(D.P.O.), whose tasks and status are defined very carefully (Article
35 and ff.) under the present German model of the ‘Daten-
schutzbeauftragter’. TheD.P.Owill collaboratewith the supervisory
authority and in our opinion will guarantee a better internal
understanding and effective application of the Data Protection
principles within the data controller’s organization.
The consistency of the actions of the supervisory authori-
ties firstly is ensured by a rule of territorial competence in the
case of a data controller having subsidiaries in different
European countries. The competence in these cases is exer-
cised by the Authority where the main establishment of the
data controller is located. Its decision, according to the obli-
gation to notify the draft measure to the other supervisory
authorities concerned (see the procedure just below), is
enforceable in all Member States (M.S.) concerned. Further-
more, the Regulation (Article 55) obliges eachM.S. supervisory
authority to cooperate with one other. One last point: the
consistency is achieved by a strong competence granted
(Article 58) to the European Data Protection Boardwhich is the
successor of the less powerful Article 29Working Group (W.G.)
of the Directive 95/46. The draft measure must be communi-
cated to the Board but also to the Commission. The famous
Article 29 WG is thus replaced by an “European Data Protec-
tion Board” (EDPB), with the same composition but entitled to
be alerted each time an envisaged national DPA measure will
affect the Trans-Border Data Flows (TBDF) or data subjects
located in another or several other countries.
So the Board might intervene each time a national super-
visory authority intends to take a decision which might affect
data subjects or data controllers located in another country.
The opinion delivered by the EDPB might be followed by an
opinion of the EU Commission in order to ensure correct and
consistent application of the Regulation or/and by a decision
of the Commission to suspend the draft measure. We under-
line the strange role played by the Commission according to
Articles 59, 60 and 61, which enact that in a last resort the
Commission may adopt an opinion to ensure ‘correct and
consistent application of this Regulation’. Such opinion must be
taken into ‘utmost account’ by the supervisory authority
otherwise it may see its measure suspended.12. Collective protection of personal data
Privacy and data protection laws frequently undergo violation
withmany legal wrongdoings, typicallymass exposure torts.12
Bringing a case before an authority is costly, which is
a circumstance that inhibits people from defending their12 For instance, the American Online (AOL) 2006 data leakage
incident released data that included 20 million web queries from
650,000 AOL users. Likewise, when Facebook decided to change
its terms of service to claim ownership over any user content on
their site, it had 175 million active users (today it has more than
845 million). Sources: http://techcrunch.com/2006/08/06/aol-
proudly-releases-massive-amounts-of-user-search-data, April 6th
2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/02/17/facebook.terms.
service/index.html, April 6th 2011 and http://newsroom.fb.com/
content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId¼22, April 6th 2012.rights. One procedural mechanism to improve the enforce-
ment of legislation and the protection of rights of victims is
“collective redress”, which allows people to claim in a single
collective redress procedure or through a representative entity
or body acting in the public interest.
In the Regulation, the framework of collective redress is
twofold: administrative and judicial. It permits data protection
NGOs to lodge complaintswith a supervisory authority (Article
73,2) and to claim judicial remedies (i.e., class actions) against
the supervisory authority, controllers and processors (Articles
74, 75 and 76,1). NGOs are allowed to do this on its behalf or on
the behalf of one or more data subjects. Having introduced
collective redress into the general data protection framework,
the Regulation takes a significant step to enhance the protec-
tion of citizens’ rights. Further developments are needed,
notably civil procedure rules to shape the operation of collec-
tive redress. For instance, in converting individual proceedings
into collective action what will be possible? What conse-
quences arise in opting for an individual procedure or a class
action?Theresponses to theseandotherquestionswilldepend
not only on the legislative progress coming from Member
States but also on the outcomesof the EuropeanCommission’s
initiative on a common framework for collective redress.1313. Transfer of personal data to third
countries or international organizations: many
open doors?
The regime of international transfer of personal data will be
significantly altered by the Regulation. Herewe emphasize the
general principles, effectiveness of data protection and new
modalities of transfer.
The Regulation allows transfers to third countries, as the
Directive 95/46 does, but also to international organizations.
Under Directive 95/46, transfers request that the third country
assures an adequate level of protection of personal data. In
contrast, the Regulation demands that its protection frame-
work must not be undermined with the transfer. Controllers
and processors involved in the transfers must comply both
with the rules related to the transfer as well as with the other
provisions of the Regulation (Article 40).
The Regulation brings important novelties to improve effec-
tiveness of data protection in the context of transfers with an
adequacydecision.Whileassessingthedataprotectionadequacy
level afforded by a third country, the Commissionmust take into
account not only the outline of the rule of law e as within the
Directive e but also new important elements concerning the
existence of effective and enforceable rights to protect data
subjects, theeffective functioningof an independent supervisory
authority and the international commitments the third country
or internationalorganization inquestionhasentered into (Article
41, 2, a, b and c). Going beyond the formality of a rule of law
assessment, thisapproachclearlyemphasizespracticalconcerns
about data protection. For this reason, it tends to give stronger
responses to privacy concerns.13 See the works of the European Commission on a common
framework for collective redress, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm, 7 March, 2012.
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Commission is the modality par excellence to transfer data.
Alternatives to transfer data are presented in a derogation
regime (Article 26), of which transfer by adequate safeguards are
an example. These safeguards may result particularly from
contractual clauses. Coupledwith derogations to the regime, the
Regulation creates new modalities of transfer, which are pre-
sented as a second best with regards to the adequacy decision.
This means that the adequacy decision is still the primary
method of undertaking international data transfers.With regard
to secondary options, the “adequate safeguards” of the Directive
become an enriched framework in which data transfers can be
accomplished through binding corporate rules, standard data
protection clauses adopted by the Commission or the supervi-
sory authority, and contractual clauses between the controller or
processor and the recipient of the data authorized by a supervi-
sory authority (Article 42, 2). New modalities are a synonym for
more flexibility to the data transfer regime, which favors free
movement data. How this flexibility will affect data protection is
a question to be answered once the law is put into practice.
Despite of this uncertainty, and particularly concerning the
derogations regime, two points deserve special attention. The
first concerns the extent of the derogation regime itself.While in
the Directive the derogations are limited to “particular cases”
(Article 26), such restriction does not exist under the Regulation
(Article 44). The second relates to the transfer authorized by
consent. The Regulation states that a transfer can be done “if the
data subject has consented to the proposed transfer, after having been
informed of the risks of such transfers due to the absence of an
adequacy decision and appropriate safeguards”. Here, it is worth
noting that the set of options available to controllers and
processors is quite enlarged. Evenwithout an adequacy decision
or any of the four alternative modalities, controllers and
processors will be still be able to legitimate and sign off data
transfers; it isenoughtoobtain theconsentof thedatasubject,on
whomtheburdenof riskwill beplaced.Doingthis, theRegulation
opens the possibility to ground the legitimacy of a data transfer
exclusively on consent, even without safeguards. The text is
contradictory to Article 7,4, which states that consent “shall not
provide a legal basis for the processing, where there is a significant
imbalance between the position of the data subject and the controller”. It
is also contradictory to the very essence of the Regulation since
transferring data without safeguards is a synonym for trans-
ferring with no data protection.14. Conclusion
This paper glimpses into thenewdataprotection regimebrought
about by the proposed Regulation of 2012. After all said and done
the search for a more flexible and effective legislation demands
double attention. Looking back, we should not disregard the factthatdataprotection ismore thanasetofdataprocessing rights; it
is an outcome of a process of protecting individual freedoms in
our Information Societies. Looking forward, putting the Regula-
tion into practice, demands using new important tools such as
the transparency principle, the joint liability rule and data
protection impact assessments. We must do all of that without
disregarding the point that the paramount function of the data
processing framework is to protect citizens.
The question therefore is whether the drafted Regulation
offers an adequate answer to the concerns we have as regards
the survival of our liberties in the Information Society? Multiple
positive points can be identified in the draft Regulation. We do
appreciate the new rights granted to the data subjects and the
possibility of collective action. We can also emphasize the
enlargement of the duties and the increasing liability of the data
controllers. In principle, the techno-legal approach (data
protection by default, data protection by design) and the duty to
initiate a data protection impact assessment are appropriate
tools for ensuring the effectiveness of the proposed protection.
But at the same time it introduces reliance upon technical
expertise to solve societal debates if there is no real debate as
regards these technical choices. The increasing roles and
competences of the data protection authorities might be
considered as positive but at the same time, as denunciated by
Flaherty in the eighties, it creates a risk that our data protection
authorities will be more afraid to take privacy friendly positions
and more desirous to play an administrative role. The Commis-
sion has been definitively empowered with new roles and as
developed will be the major player in the implementation of
many of the provisions in contrast to Member States.
Theneed for a consistent anduniformapproach is themain
legitimate justification both for ensuring the correct func-
tioning of the internal market but also for defending the
European position vis-à-vis the rest of the world. At the same
time we fear that harmonization will hinder fruitful competi-
tion between the Members States’ approaches and solutions
whichwould otherwise benefit our liberties. Finally, as already
asserted, we deplore the fact that the reference to the right to
Privacy has been deeply cut off and that data protection is now
consideredas a constitutional principle per se. Itmust be feared
that the link with the quite innovative jurisprudential devel-
opments of the Strasbourg Court and the preeminence of the
libertarian approach will be favored and that the imple-
mentation of the Regulation will lead to no more than
a simplistic balance between different contradictory interests.
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